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RELEVANCE OF VALUE JUDGMENT IN LAW
Meera Matthew*

ABSTRACT
The present paper undertakes an analysis of the role value judgments have
played and continue to do in our legal system. For this, the articlefirst is
a survey of the concept of "value judgments" and therefore, deals with the
theoretical understandingof values and their applicationsthrough the course
of the development of the law. The attendant issues of subjectivity and the
positivist outlook on the same is discussed in the same manner,a survey of
the development of perspectives with time. The different approaches taken
by jurists such as Dworkin have been discussed. The author then studies
the take of the Indian Supreme Court and International Law on value
judgments and the role they play in formulating law. The author concludes
that value judgments may be attuned to the changingrequirements of a legal
system provided they are reached in a sound manner,This would be a happy
arrangement,unless the value judgment which is deemed to be needed is not
amenable to change as a part of its nature. However, the author'spoint, that
criticism of value judgments without the context being studied is vague, is
undoubtedly taken well.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"The Judge is under a duty, within the limits of his power of innovation,
to maintain a relation between law and morals, between the percepts of
jurisprudenceand those of reason and good conscience." '
- Justice Cardozo

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the concept of a value judgment
and its significance in laws. In general, the term value judgment is defined as an
expression of an attitude or outlook towards something. Most of the judgments are
often not value judgments although they appear to be, just because they contain
words like 'good', 'should', or 'must'. Such judgments are often regarded as value
2
judgments; nevertheless they are sometimes at best pseudo value judgments.
According to Georg Spielthenner 3, for moral research, a clear perception of value
judgments is vital for at least three reasons. First, ethical judgments are a certain
kind of value judgments. Therefore, a clear concept of a moral judgment cannot
be understood, unless one understands what a value judgment is. Secondly, 'a
well-founded normative ethics', so as to justify the judgments about what things,
acts, or qualities are good or bad, right or wrong. Thirdly, the 'applied ethics',
wherein, it is essential for the application of general normative theories. Values are
so inextricably woven into our language, thought and behavior patterns that they
have fascinated philosophers for millennia, yet they have proved so'quick- silvery'
and complex that, despite their decisive role in human motivation, we remain
desperately ignorant of the laws that govern them.' Policy makers and scholar
have been equally troubled by how much importance they should place on the
role of values and attitudes in the modernization process. The real problem is to
analyze and sort out the values that motivate administrative, social and individual
behavior of administrators at various levels of administration. Values differ from
individual to individual, group to group and community to community.5
Many philosophers, especially the positivists, are of the view that value
judgments express 'what is' instead of 'what should be' in guiding social decisions.
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Different societies have different value judgments. Therefore, the value judgments
included in the social welfare function have no meaning except when related to a
specified society.6A related meaning of value judgment is an expedient evaluation
based upon limited information at hand, an evaluation undertaken because a
decision must be made on short notice7 and are determined by the current political
and social environments, past social experiences and institutional constraints. To
understand the correct meaning of value judgment, one needs to understand the
meaning of value.

II. MEANING OF THE CONCEPT OF 'VALUE'
Robin Williams,8 in his attempt to clarify the concept of values states as
follows:
"Values as empirical elements in human behaviour certainly arise out of
human experience."

John C. Harsanyi9 states that value is subjective in nature because value
exists only in the presence of and for a subject. This view is like the views of most
psychologists and decision scientists. Thus, he starts from the definition of utility in
terms of personal preference. He had a specific conception of objectivity based on
which all values, except the exchange value of money and is considered subjective.
Those values that look objective are said to be pseudo-objective.
The concept of value and its qualities are extensively explained in the paper
"Value Theory: Toward Conceptual Clarification".10 It is stated that individual's
and society's value system are interdependent systems of interaction. Both are
determinative of behaviour, just as both are concurrently shaped by the actions
of their 'carriers' and members. Chief among the environmental stimuli initiating
the individual's actions are the admonitory and modeling behaviour of 'significant
6

Zheng Mingli, &Sajid Anwar, Rational Legal Decision-Making,Value Judgmentand Efficient
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others'. And each act, in turn, affects the culture of which it forms a part. Beliefs
about the 'real' and about the 'good' are twin aspects of the personal character or
value system, while the knowledge and normative systems interact at the cultural
level. The two levels of systems are interpenetrating and continually shaping one
another in their parallel evolution.
The following were explicitly provided as characteristics of value":Values as norms wherein prevailing recognition of values with normative
rules had been conferred
*

Values as cultural ideals wherein it was stated that values vary from attitudes
in that they surpass accurate situations and have to do with universal modes
12
of conduct (instrumental values) and end states of reality (terminal values)

*

Values as estimation of action wherein the statement of Landes13 is important.
In a 1967 study, he measures what he considers to be values by having
respondents rank fifty behavioral items on a ten-point scale from "least to
most worst".

*

Values as objects - In defining values as objects Turner 14 considered values as
objects to the degree that they are shared and in the public domain. Perry's I5
claim that a theory of value must refer to the emergence of interests focusing
on objects is fairly representative of this point of view.

*

Values as value orientations- The term 'value orientation' seems to have
gained more rapidly in popularity than has the concept, and is now often
6
confusingly interchanged with 'attitude1

*

Values as behaviour probabilities - Franz Adler1 ' claims that in order for
values to qualify as concepts of social science they must be defined in terms of

11

Supra note 10, at 178.
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behaviour. He sees them as learned components of personalities identifiable
only as probabilities that a particular behaviour will occur in a variety of
circumstances.
Values as generalized attitudes -According to Rokeach 8 values (like attitudes)
are predispositions to act, they differ from attitudes in their transcendence
of specific objects and situations
Critical legal studies by Fitapatrick and Hunt 19 emphasize that there is no
universal concept of justice or fairness. The social welfare function is subjective to
a society and the changes in social environment, such as technological progresses
and interest group activities, affect social preferences and change social value
judgments. Lobbying activities are used to influence social preferences; the
activities of judges and juries are attempting to recover the social preferences Public
administrators necessarily make value judgments in order to promote equity in
the provision of public services, within the interpreted intent of the legislation."

III. VALUE JUDGMENT
The dictionary meaning of value judgmentis 'a personal estimate of merit
in a particular respect' or 'an assessment that reveals more about the values of the
person making the assessment than about the reality of what is assessed'.
No discipline or combination of disciplines can provide a value-free basis
for prescribing a constitution or any set of rules.? Value jurisprudence dwells in
the minds of legal theorists for many years. The past century brought up many
changes, including the change in notion, changing the understanding of law 'as
rules' into a concept of law 'as values'.
'lis scriptum' indeed constitutes an intrinsic part of any legal system, yet it

19

Rokeach Milton, BELITFS, ATTITUDES AND VALUES (1968); Rokeach Milton, A Theory of
Organizationand Change within Value-A titude Systems, 24 JOURNAL OF SOCIAL ISSUES 1333(1968).
P. FrrAPATRIC, & A. HUNT, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (Basil-Blackwell, 1987).

20
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Alessi De Louis, Efficiencycriteriafor optimal laws: Objective standardsor value judgements?,
3(3) CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 321-342.
Latinterm for "written law . lus scriptum was the body of statute laws made by the
legislature.

18

23

Vol. 24(l)

National Law School of India Review

2012

is not self-sufficient. Written law lacunas, controversies and ambiguities cannot be
confronted solely in the context of written norms, for law encompasses the values
and principles that have emerged from the broader social context and provide for
the coherence of the legal order. Apart from giving a foundation for norm creation,
and ever more importantly, the value approach is an indispensable instrument
for reaching just judicial decision-making in individual cases. Namely, judges
increasingly use the flexibility of law to maximize the possibility of reaching just
decisions in concrete cases.2
Justice Cardozo stated that there are three types of conflicts that come before
the courts for adjudication. They are as follows:*

Where the rule of law is clear and its application to facts is equally clear.

*

Where the rule of law is clear and the sole question is about its application.

*

Where neither the rule of law nor its application is clear.

However, according to Cardozo, it is the third situation which is serious
business for judges where a value judgment could be given which has the potential
of having the effect of advancement or retardation of development of law.
In a seminar held in 2008, Wall Art Museum, Beijing,Z the forum summed
up the discussion on value judgment in the following way:*

Value is statistical in nature, because the subject may be a group of people,
all members of society, or even all human beings in the world, and the value
of any object for the members of any group of people varies from member
to member.

*

The statistical nature of value can be derived not only from the dimension of
subject, but also from the dimensions of object and judge because the object,
instead of a single particular one, may be the abstract concept of a class of
objects, and the judge, instead of a certain person, may be of statistical nature
in one, two, or three dimensions namely, the dimensions of object, subject,
and the judge.

24

Svetislava Bulaji, Value Jurisprudencein Contemporary Constitutionalreview, A challenge

25
26

before Serbi, VII1 World Congress of the International Association of Constitutional
Law Athens (11-15 June, 2007).
B. N. CARDOzoTHE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 133 (2004).
Value judgments and Orientationof Young Critics,Seminar by Young Critics' Forum.
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"

Incorporation of utility theory is essential, since value is an integral part of
it and makes utility the starting point of utilitarian general theory value.

*

There is no compulsion to use the traditional and conventional classification
of value into intrinsic and instrumental. The classification of the members
of a set into subsets is arbitrary, so that any classification is all right, as long
as it classifies the whole set into disjoint subsets and covers all members.

*

Fifthly, since utilitarianism is consequential and teleological, one should take
a decision-theoretic approach to the study of actions in life. Therefore, nonmoral actions are guided by rationality and prudence, while moral actions
are guided by rationality, prudence and morality as well.

IV. CRITICISMS
Primarily, some of those who object may be concerned about the personal
biases and agendas of administrators making the value judgments and their
concern that self-interest might interfere with the promotion of social equity.
Some philosophers are of the opinion that the average street-level bureaucrat
regularly faces demands and pressures from multiple directions and often has the
opportunity to substitute his or her self- interest for the public interest.2 7
Some are of the view that the idea of public servants making value judgments
is to promote their equality and equitable access to public services is appalling to
those small-minded people. In addition, many conservatives and other people do
not support the distribution of welfare services to the poor, instead thinking that
the poor just need to pull themselves up by their boot straps. They may view the
value judgments of public administrators as preventing the poor from making it
on their own, or they may feel that the poor should not receive public services
28
they do not pay for.
Those more familiar with private bureaucracies than public bureaucracies
may be offended by the lack of the ethic of neutrality when considering the
scenario of public administrators making value judgments of any kind. The ethic
of neutrality does not allow for the exercise of independent moral judgment in
policy implementation, beyond what is needed after determining the intent of the
legislators and elected officials. 29
27
28

J.M. SHAFRITZ &A.C. HYDE CLAssics OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (2008).
S. Maynard-Moody. & M. Musheno, State Agent or Citizen Agent: Two Narratives of
Discretion, 10 JOURNAL OF PUBLIC AOMINISTRATION RESEARCH AND THEORY 329-58(2000).
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V. VALUE JUDGMENTS AND THE SCHOOLS OF
JURISPRUDENCE
One finds philosophers who took the enquiry concerning the nature of law
to be an attempt to define the meaning of the word 'law'. Traditionally those
who adopted the linguistic approach concentrated on the word 'law'. However,
it encountered the overwhelming problem that word is used in a multiplicity of
non-legal contexts. We have laws of nature and scientific laws, laws of God and
thought, of logic and of language, etc. Clearly the explanation of 'law' has to
account for its use in all these contexts and equally clearly any explanation which
is so wide and general can be of very little use to legal philosophers.0 Only one
assumption can be the explanation of 'law' hope to provide the answer to the
legal philosopher's inquiry into the nature of law. That assumption is that the use
of 'law' in all its contexts but one is analogical or metaphorical or in some other
way parasitical on its core meaning as displayed in its use in one type of context
and that that core meaning is the one the legal philosopher has at the centre of his
enquiry. Unfortunately, the assumption is mistaken. Its implausibility is best seen
by examining the most thorough and systemic attempt to provide an analysis of
'law' based on this assumption, that proposed by John AustinY
According to Hans Kelsen a judgment that an actual behavior is such as it
ought to be or ought not to be according to a valid norm is a value judgment.YAs
stated in this generality, his position cannot be accepted in its implications for the
legal process. Not all acts by which a judge subsumes the facts as found by him
under a formal or informal source of law are evaluative in character. Where the
judge uses analytical reasoning, the scope of judicial axiology" is either minimal
or greatly reduced. Where dialectical reasoning is employed by a court, the range
of evaluation of the contemplated result in terms of its righteousness or justice
may be very wide but nonetheless subject to limitations imposed by the nature of
the social system. The evaluative factor is excluded from judicial decision-making
when a norm that is unambiguous in its core meaning is clearly applicable to the
facts of the case. Thus, where a premeditated homicide has been proved beyond a
reasonable doubt by uncontested evidence, the conclusion that the defendant has

30

31
32
33

M.D.A. FREEMAN, INTRODUCTION To JURISPRUDENCE- MEANING OF LAw (7th edn., 2004).
John Austin, The Philosophyof Positive Law, 1LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE (1869).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
The term axiology is derived from the Greek word axios (valuable) and designates
the sphere of evaluative, as distinguished from logical or descriptive, assertions.
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committed murder does not call for the making of value judgment. Its conclusion
in that event is reached by the logical method of syllogistic deductionY Even in the
area of creative determination of the law, judicial discretion is usually restricted
by the general nature of the social system. As pointed out in the preceding section,
value patterns of the culture tend to form hedges and moats which bar the free
roaming of judicial valuation,5 For example, in a liberal society recognizing a
far-reaching freedom of contract, it would be difficult for a court to invalidate an
agreement (in the absence of a positive prohibition) on the ground of repugnancy
to public policy and justice, unless a strong case can be made out to show that
basic notions of collective morality were violated by the agreement, or that the
integrity of social fabric would be jeopardized by its enforcement. 6 Only rarely
are value judgments pronounced by judges autonomous in the sense that they
are independent of the mores, fundamental premises and social ideals of the time
and place. The movement as a whole, therefore, is far too complex to admit of
generalizations without careful and extensive qualifications. Only one problem
can, and must, be selected because it has a specific bearing on the destruction of
science, that is, the attempt at making political science (and the social sciences in
general) 'objective' through a methodologically rigorous exclusion of all 'valuejudgments'. 37

In order to arrive at clarity about the issue, it must first of all be realized that the
terms 'value-judgment' and 'value-free' science were not part of the philosophical
vocabulary before the second half of the nineteenth century. The notion of a valuejudgment according to Werturteil is meaningless in itself;m it gains its meaning from
a situation in which it is opposed to judgments concerning facts. This situation
was created through the positivistic conceit that only propositions concerning
facts of the phenomenal world were 'objective,' while judgments concerning the
right order of soul and society were 'subjective'. Only propositions of the first type
34

It is possible, however, that an element of appraisal was present in the fact-finding
process if it was necessary for the court to form an opinion about the trustworthiness
of a witness.

35

It might be said that these barriers to unrestrained law making by judges are a part

36

of institutional "is" of society, as opposed to Kelsen's view that the normative system
dwells in the realm of the "ought".
For example, a court in society dedicated to the idea of freedom might take the position
that a voluntary agreement to serve as another's slave is incompatible with fundamental
values of the society.

37

CooPER,BARRY & VOEGELIN, ERIC VOEGELIN AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN POLITICAL
SCIENCE, 285.

38
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could be considered 'scientific', while propositions of the second type expressed
personal preferences and decisions, incapable of critical verification and therefore
devoid of objective validity.3
Cass R. Sunstein" in his book "Conflicting values in law" states that as
follows:"What I want to do is explore two claims and say something about their
implication for law. The first claim is that we value things in different
ways; that is to say, we value things not only in terms of intensity,
but in qualitatively distinct ways. It is not simply the case that some
things are valued more; it is also the case that some things are valued
more; it is also the case that some things are valued differently from
others. That is my first claim; about different modes of valuation. 1
The second claim is that human goods are not commensurable. This
is to say that there is no available metric along which we can align
the various goods that are important to us, and that effort to come up
with a metric, like utility or dollars, while nominally designed to aid
human reasoning, actually makes human reasoning worse that what
it is when it is working well. So the first claim has to do with diverse
modes of valuation; the second has to do with incommensurability."
According to J.S. Mill,4 2 nothing is more curious than the absence of

recognition in any of his writings of the existence of conscience, as a thing distinct
from philanthropy, from affection for God or man, and from self-interest in this
World or in the next. Nor is it only the moral part of man's nature, that he overlooks;
he but faintly recognizes, as a fact in human nature, the pursuit of any other ideal
end for its own sake.
Vittorio Villa 43 is of the opinion that the legal positivism has a much broader

scope than what is currently assumed, because it includes all the conceptions that
presuppose a certain concept of positive law, a concept according to which:

39

40

Positivism (III), The Shift from Theory to Method; "Value Judgments and FactJudgments"
f 5 THE NEW SCIENCE Or POLITICS INTmonurroN, 95-96. [U.Chicago ed., p 1Q12]
Originally published as "Conflicting values in Law", 62 FORDHAM LAW REvIEW 1661-73

(1994).
41
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MILL, MILL ON BENTHAM AND COLERIDGE 66-68 (F.R. Lewis ed., 1962).
Vittorio Villa, Inclusive Legal Positivism, Legal Interpretation, and Value-Judgments,
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RATIO JuRIs 110-127

(2009).

Relevance of Value Judgment in Law
i.

Law is always and integrally an human product;

ii.

This product is radically contingent, in the sense that its connection with
morals, which could even be considered as "necessary" for certain legal
systems - this is the case of our current western legal systems.

Therefore Villa regards the values that are always context-bound, that is,
values which can never be objectively justified. From this point of view, there is
amutually exclusive opposition between legal naturalism and legal positivism
(opposition which amounts to an opposition between ethical objectivism and
ethical relativism): both could be defined putting the sign of negation before the
opposite one (positivist or naturalist).
It is important to remark that, according to this definition, even legal realism
(and Dworkin's theory) is a form of positivism explains in 'Legal Theory and Value
Judgment'" that that there is a sort of dichotomical opposition between two kinds
of discourses referring to positive law: the first one is "descriptive" in character,
because its aim is informative: it tries, as a matter of fact, to give either theoretical
explanations of certain general features of positive law (from the point of view of
legal theory), or semantical reconstructions of some specific part of a given legal
system (from the point of view of legal dogmatics); the second one is 'evaluative'
in character, because it expresses, albeit in different ways, some sort of -ethical,
political, ideological, etc.- attitudes or commitments on the given object. 5
This opposition is by no means a necessary feature of legal positivism; but,
anyway, if it is accepted, then a more specific methodological thesis can be derived
from it: that one according to which it is at least possible, if not highly recommended,
for legal theorists and jurists, to produce purely descriptive discourses on positive
law, that is discourses in which every kind of value-judgments or of -political,
ethical, etc. - commitments is radically excluded. This thesis can -and is in fact- be
held by positivist independently of the different ways in which these descriptive
discourses could be qualified (for instance, as scientific discourses, in a strong or
in a weak sense etc.).
Dean Roscoe Pound in his theory of social engineering concerned himself
more with the effects and impacts of law in the society," and the contemporary
44

Virroo ViLLA, CONSTRUCTING LEGAL SvsmMs -EUROPEAN UNION IN LEGAL THEORY

45
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447-477 (N. MacCormick et al eds, 1997).
Supra note 45, at 450.
Roscoe Pound, Lawyer as a Social Engineer,3 JOURNAL
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needs of the society to have a meaningful rule of law. He argued for greater
importance to the creative role of judiciary in response to the arising needs
of modern democratic societies.

VI.

SUPREME COURT ON VALUE JUDGMENT

The Constitution can have no meaning if not embedded in a shared practice
of interpretation, and what legitimates a particular act of interpretation is the form
or grammar of the argument that it rests upon.4 7 The Supreme Court of India has
progressively adopted a futuristic task and delivered a number of value judgments.
It has pronounced a glut of judgments inculcating social, moral, constitutional,
religious and human right values into the legal system and thereby introduced a
number of doctrines and principles. E.g. the concept of PIL.
In Shankari Prasad v. Union of India" Supreme Court refused to put any
restrictions on the amending (i.e. constituent) power of the parliament under Article
368, and held that it includes power to amend any law under Article 13 and also the
constitution itself. In Golak Nath v. State of Punjab', the majority (4:1) held that part
III of the constitution of India is not amendable under the constituent powers of
the parliament, apprehending that the dilution or curtailment of the Fundamental
Rights would result into a totalitarian regime in the country.
Also in several cases, Supreme Court has relied on Human Rights
jurisprudence in interpreting Right to life and liberty of individual. Olga Tellis
v. Bombay Municipal Corporation,0 Gaurav fain v. Union of India,51 P.U.D.R. v Police
Commissioner the Supreme Court widened the meaning of Right to Life as
incorporated in Article 21 of Indian Constitution and thereby gave significance
to human values.
It is with a notion that new Judgments are not ought to be given on the basis
of values as understood decades ago, but they are to be identified in a very up to
date sense and should be inculcated in the judicial process to serve suitably the

47

Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution,120 HARVARD

51

REVIEW 1737 (2007).
Shankari Prasad v. Union of India, AIR 1,951 SC 458 [Supreme Court of India].
Golaknath v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1643 [Supreme Court of India].
Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, AIR1986 SC 180 [Supreme Court of
India].
Gaurav Jain v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 292 [Supreme Court of India].

52

PUD.R. v. Police Commissioner, (1989) 4 SCC 730 [Supreme Court of India].

48
49
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real societal needs and then only a judgment could qualify to be termed as a value
judgment.
There are various cases wherein Supreme Court laid emphasis on value
judgment also.
In the case U.P State Road Transport v. Mohd. Ismail3 it was held as follows:"'....thediscretion should not be exercised according to caprice and
ritual. The discretion should be exercised reasonably and rationally.
It should be exercised faithfully and impartially. There should be
proper value judgment with fairness and equity."
In State Bank of India v.M.R. Ganesh Babus it was held as follows:"One cannot deny that often the difference is a matter of degree
and that there is an element of value judgment by those who are
charged with the administration in fixing the scales of pay and other
conditions of service. So long as such value judgment is made bona
fide, reasonably on an intelligible criterion which has a rational nexus
with the object of differentiation, such differentiation will not amount
to discrimination 5 The principle is not always easy to apply as there
are inherent difficulties in comparing and evaluating the work done
by different persons in different organizations, or even in the same
organization. Differentiation in pay scales of persons holding same
posts and performing similar work on the basis of difference in the
degree of responsibility, reliability and confidentiality would be a
valid differentiation. The judgment of administrative authorities
concerning the responsibilities which attach to the post, and the degree
of reliability expected of an incumbent, would be a value judgment of
the authorities concerned which, if arrived at bona fide, reasonably
and rationally, was not open to interference by the court."
In the other case in Federationof All India Customs v. Union of India on 5 May,
198856 while deciding whether equal pay for equal work is a concomitant of
Article 14 of the Constitution, it was again held that there should be a reasonable
53
54

U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Mohd. Ismail, (1991) 2 SCR 274 [Supreme
Court of India].
State Bank of India v. M.R. Ganesh Babu, AIR 2002 SC 1955 [Supreme Court bf India].

55
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intelligible criteria having a lucid equilibrium with the object of differentiation,
such differentiation will not amount to discrimination.
The judgments laid down by the Apex Court in terms of value judgments
have its own tribulations. The notion of the subjective views of certain judgments
being specially privileged may grate against the democratic sensibilities of
contemporary society. Stated simply, the dilemma of subjectivity in value judgment
is the problem of defending one's evaluation of a theatrical performance as being
anything more than a matter of personal opinion. Evaluative assertions appear
often to be statements about the objective nature of a performance; but on closer
examination, they invariably turn out to be manifestations of the critic's subjective
responses to the performance. As such, the validity of these assertions becomes
questionable, and their status as important components of the critical process
becomes highly problematic.," Appreciating the findings of Northrop Frye, let me
quote "Value-judgments are subjective in the sense that they can be indirectly but not
directly communicated. When they arefashionableor generallyaccepted, they look objective,
butthat is all. The demonstrablevalue-judgment is the donkey's carrotof literarycriticism,
has been accompaniedby a belief thatcriticism hasfinally
and every new criticalfashion...
devised a definitive techniquefor separatingthe excellent from the less excellent. But this

always turns out to be an illusion of the history of taste."

VII.

INTERNATIONAL LAWS ON VALUE JUDGMENT

Under international law, an expression can only be legitimately deemed
defamatory when it relates to a false fact that lowers somebody's reputation. The
dissemination of true information or of an opinion should never lead to a guilty
verdict under defamation laws.
The European Court of Human Rights has noted that:
"... [A] careful distinction must be made between facts and value-

judgments. The existence of facts can be demonstrated, whereas the
truth of value-judgments is not susceptible of proof. As regards value
judgments this requirement [to prove their truth) is impossible of
fulfillment and it infringes freedom of opinion itself.""
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David K. Rod ,The Problem of Subjectivity in Value Judgment, SPRING 95 (1988).
FRYE AND NORTHROP, ANATOMY OF CRITIClsM: FOUR EssAYs (1957).

Oberschlick v. Austria, Judgment of 23 May 1991, Application No. 11662/85 [European
Court of Human Rights].

Relevance of Value Judgment in Law
Judges traditionally have tried to keep away from making judgments of
aesthetic value in the variety of context where such issues occur, such as copyright,
6
customs law, and obscenity.W
In justifying his refusal to evaluate the quality of the
2 Live Crew parody, Justice Souter quotes from a 1903 opinion by Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes:
"....It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to
the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of (a work),
outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits. At the one extreme
some works of genius would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very
novelty would make them repulsive until the public had learned the
new language in which their author spoke...
In addition to Holmes' oft-cited rationale, another explanation for this judicial
reluctance is the pervasive view among judges and others in the legal community
that judgments of aesthetic value are "subjective '"6 and thus presumably impossible
for courts to determine according to objective standards for judicial reasoning.
Justice Souter, in the Pretty Woman decision, 65 does slip in a small but telling
reference to the low or at least modest aesthetic value of the parody. He says in
passing that "we might not assign a high rank to the periodicelement here." Justice Souter
does not in this passage expressly say that aesthetic evaluations are necessarily
subjective. Indeed, the word 'subjective' never appears in this decision. But the
construction of these sentences suggests that he equates a determination of aesthetic
value with an exercise of taste. Taste, in everyday language as well as the language
of the aesthetician, suggests subjectivity. The reluctance of judges to make aesthetic
evaluations would be understood as a belief that it would be inappropriate to
impose personal standards of taste in a judicial forum. Even if a judge believed
objective aesthetic judgments were possible, the difficulty of supporting such
judgments also might lead them to decline to do so in their judicial capacity.
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Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) [US Supreme Court]. The U.S. Supreme Court
upheld laws prohibiting obscene, exempting works of "serious artistic value".
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VIII. CONCLUSION

Harry W. Jones said,"
" Law is not a form of art for art's sake; its ends in view are social,
nothing more or nothing less than the establishment and maintenance
of a social environment in which the quality of human life can be
spirited, improving and unimpaired".
Value judgment could be assumed as an important instrument through which
law can be adapted and modified to meet the rapid changing new challenges of
future. When the scientific results are measured objectively, they are held also
cautiously, with the understanding that, more careful evidence or wider experience
might change matters. Further, a scientific view is a value judgment based upon
rigorous evaluation and wide consensus. With this example in mind, characterizing
a view as a value judgment is vague without description of the context surrounding
it.
A value system is more a matter of perception for the policy making levels
and does not affect the day-to-day operational levels in an organization. Initially
traditional values may be an impediment to the behavioral change, but if the
incentives for the latter ar strong, behavior does change and value changes often.65
The conflict between the old and the new value systems poses a real challenge
to the administrators and bureaucrats because the two have not been integrated
or synthesized." Once we make out that moral learning is an option for us, we
can distinguish a broader range of ways of dealing with moral conflicts than
was canvass in the last section. There, moral conflicts were described in a way
that assumed that the set of moral considerations, among which conflicts were
arising, was to be taken as fixed. In a nutshell, it can be said that value judgments
are the need of the hour since they are specifically resorted to meet certain extraordinary circumstances. To keep up with the ever changing societal patterns law
needs to be as vibrant as the society. Since we all know about the limitations and
time constraints of the legislature and only legal rules and principles provided in
a very objective manner cannot be made fit to each and every case, and it is there
we need to make more subjective principles which may fit objectively to a given
situation. Thus the role of judiciary and value-judgments cannot be undervalued.
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Harry W. Jones, An Invitation to Jurisprudence,74
Supra note 4.

66

Supra note 4, at ll.
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Relevance of Value Judgment in Law
Of course, rating critical evaluations on the basis of characteristics possessed
by the critics making those evaluations is not really a solution to the problem
of subjectivity in criticism. It is more like an admission of defeat. Subjectivity is
inescapable; therefore, rather than trying to avoid subjectivity, we try to identify
the most suitable subject. In practical terms, the best we can do is, first, to choose
carefully which critical voices we pay attention to and, second, for those of us who
are educators, to bend our efforts toward raising the level of critical responsiveness
in future theatre audiences.
To conclude with, the extracts of speech given by Smt. Indira Gandhi is
striking to be highlighted:"'
"The search for values has to be a continuous process, accompanied
by a constant endeavor to lead lives approximating to those values.
Value merely perceived is value-less. It must be lived."
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Smt. Indira Gandhi's Address given on January 3, 1981, at a Seminar on 'Value
Orientation in Human Problem Solving', organised by Vivekandanda Nidhi, Calcutta.
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